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Abstract
This paper studies a overlapping generations economy with capital where limited
communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for
at money. We assume a production function with a knowledge-externality (Romer-
style) that nests economies with endogenous growth (AK form) and those with no long
run growth (the Diamond model). We show that the Tobin e¤ect is always operative.
Under CRRA preferences, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion, we also show that
for some positive ination to be optimal and for the Friedman rule to be sub-optimal, it
is su¢ cient (but not necessary) that there be a mild degree of social increasing returns.
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1 Introduction
The Friedman rule, Milton Friedmans classic prescription for the optimal conduct of mon-
etary policy, remains to date the most signicant dictum in monetary theory. Friedman
(1969) argued that good monetary policy is one that equates the private opportunity cost
of holding money (the nominal interest rate) to its social opportunity cost (which is zero).
By this logic, optimal monetary policy should never be expansionary. Critics were quick to
point out potential problems with this line of thinking. Phelps (1973) argued that follow-
ing a contractionary policy as proposed by Friedman may require the government to make
up the lost seigniorage using distortionary means which may negate the alleged benet of
the policy. Symmetrically, others have argued that seigniorage may have enough benecial
uses to justify an expansionary policy.1
This paper studies a third potential limitation of Friedmans logic using an argument
rst articulated in Tobin (1965): what if monetary expansion caused income to rise and
grow, thereby overwhelming the non-distortionary benet of following a contractionary
policy? In todays parlance, if the Tobin e¤ect is operative, can the Friedman rule ever be
optimal? In a sense, the Tobin e¤ect and the Friedman rule represent two divergent views
on the desirability of ination. The former argues that ination, by raising the relative
return to capital, stimulates capital formation and hence growth. The latter argues that
monetary expansion raises the opportunity cost of holding real balances and makes liquidity,
potentially a desirable commodity, more costly. Which e¤ect dominates?
1Levine (1991) considers an environment in which there are two types of innitely-lived agents who
randomly become buyers or sellers and information on agentstype is private. If buyers value consumption
su¢ ciently more than sellers do, and if there is some randomness in the economy, then Levine shows that
the optimal monetary policy is expansionary and not contractionary as the Friedman rule would suggest.
As in our setting, lump-sum taxes that fund the contraction are imposed symmetrically on both the types.
As such, a contraction hurts an unlucky buyer and because buyers value consumption su¢ ciently more
than sellers do, this monetary action hurts buyers more than it benets sellers and hence reduces overall
welfare.
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This paper addresses this question within the context of a monetary growth model.
We specify an overlapping generations model economy with capital where limited commu-
nication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for at money.
At the end of each period, a fraction of agents is relocated; only at money is useful as
a means to communicate with their past (hence the limited communication). The
stochastic relocationsact like shocks to agentsportfolio preferences and, in particular,
trigger liquidations of some assets at potential losses. They have the same consequences
as liquidity preference shocks in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and motivate a role for
banks that take deposits, hold cash reserves. The other asset is a commonly available neo-
classical technology with knowledge externalities, as in Romer (1986); more specically,
the production function is given by Yt = A K

t K

t L
1 
t , where Kt denotes the capital stock
of an individual producer, Lt denotes the amount of labor hired, and Kt it the aggregate
capital stock in the economy. The assumed knowledge-externality form of the production
function nests economies with endogenous growth (AK form, i.e.,  +  = 1) and those
with no long run growth (i.e.,  +  < 1 as in the classic Diamond (1965) model).
Our results are as follows. We show that the Tobin e¤ect is always operative irrespec-
tive of the degree of risk aversion of agents. Under logarithmic utility, we show that the
Friedman rule is not optimal (stationary welfare maximizing) if the steady state is dynam-
ically e¢ cient. In this case, we can also show that zero ination is not optimal (indeed
some amount of positive ination is). Under the more general CRRA form of preferences,
we nd that a su¢ cient (not necessary) condition for some positive ination to be optimal
is that  +  2 (1=2; 1) ; for most realistic values of ; this translates into a requirement
that the societal production function exhibit mild increasing returns. For parameter values
such that the economy is dynamically e¢ cient under logarithmic utility, the Friedman rule
is not optimal for any value of the risk aversion parameter.
These results stand in contrast to those obtained in economies with linear (xed real
return) storage technologies. Since almost all the literature thus far has focused on linear
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storage economies and not on neoclassical production economies, an important contribution
of this paper is to highlight the fact that optimal monetary policy is strikingly di¤erent in
these two kinds of economies. As discussed in Wallace (1980), a linear storage economy is
one in which 1 unit invested in date-t storage (or capital) returns x > 1 units of date-t+1
units of the consumption good. By denition, such economies are dynamically e¢ cient.
Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005) and others have demonstrated that linear storage
random relocation economies, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion, always return a
verdict in favor of zero ination. Here, in contrast we are able to show, for example, that for
logarithmic utility, zero ination is never optimal if the economy is dynamically e¢ cient.
The reason is that in economies with linear storage technologies, storage holdings of the
current generation do not inuence the incomes of future generations. In contrast, with
neoclassical production, any seigniorage collected is rebated to the young which augments
the deposit base of the young, and in standard cases, raises the investment in capital, and
hence future incomes.
Our paper complements the work by Paal and Smith (2004) who study suboptimality
of the Friedman rule in an environment with endogenous growth that shares many similar-
ities with ours. In a money-in-the-utility-function overlapping generations economy with
production, Weiss (1980) nds that the optimal policy produces positive ination. Smith
(1998) studies an overlapping generations monetary economy with production in which the
rate of return dominance issue is settled by postulating a minimum size to capital invest-
ment that limits one group of agents to holding money. By focusing on the dynamically
ine¢ cient equilibria, he shows that welfare at the Friedman rule may be dominated by
other feasible monetary policies. Similarly, Palivos (2005) studies an overlapping genera-
tions economy with production and heterogeneity in preference for altruism and nds that
a case for positive ination can be made even when capital does not respond to ination.
Our work also complements that of Dutta and Kapur (1998) who pose the exact question
as ours in a overlapping generations economy with irreversible unobservable capital invest-
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ments and uninsured liquidity preference risk (similar to ours). They nd that the optimal
ination rate is positive if the Tobin e¤ect is not operative.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the environment,
the set of primitives, the spatial and informational constraints generating limited com-
munication and the behavior of banks. Section 3 describes the general equilibrium while
Section 4 discusses optimal monetary policy under di¤erent assumptions about +. The
nal section includes some concluding remarks and the appendices contain proofs of all the
major results.
2 The Environment
2.1 Primitives
The economy take place at innitely many dates t = 0; 1, : : :, 1. It is populated by
two-period lived overlapping generations of agents who live on two separate islands. At
each date t > 0; a continuum of mass 1 of agents is born on each island.2 Young agents
are endowed with 1 unit of labor which they supply inelastically while old agents have no
endowment. As is standard in much of this literature, we assume agents derive utility from
consuming the economys consumption good (c) only when old. The utility function can
be represented by u(c) = c1 '=(1  '); ' > 0; if ' = 1; then u(c) = ln c:
The consumption good is produced by a representative rm which rents capital and
hires labor from young agents. The Romer-style production function is given by
Yt = F ( Kt; Lt;Kt) = A K

t K

t L
1 
t ; (1)
where Kt denotes the capital stock of an individual producer, Lt denotes the amount of
labor hired, and Kt it the aggregate capital stock in the economy. As is standard, Kt
2We ignore the initial oldin all of what follows. By optimal monetary policy, we are therefore referring
to the golden rule monetary policy. See below and Paal and Smith (2004) for more on this.
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is taken as given by individual rms. To simplify the algebra, we assume that capital
depreciates completely from one period to the next. We assume that  2 [0; 1  ]. Hence,
if  = 0, equation (1) reduces to the standard neoclassical production function as in the
Diamond (1965) model. On the other hand, if  = 1  , then equation (1) takes the form
of the standard endogenous growth (AK) production function. Note that this function
can be expressed in terms of the capital-labor ratio. We denote this ratio by k and write
Yt = f(kt; kt) or Yt = f(kt) when there is no confusion. We assume that k0 > 0 is a given.
Because of competition, factors are paid their marginal return. The rental rate on
capital and the wage rate are, respectively,
   (k) = Ak+ 1; (2)
w  w (k) = A (1  ) k+ : (3)
2.2 Informational and spatial constraints
As in Townsend (1980) and (1987), a role for money arises in this economy because of
informational and spatial constraints. Details of the nature of these constraints and the
environment can be found in Schreft and Smith (1998); we only provide a brief sketch below.
We assume that agents are born on two di¤erent islands and that a constant fraction  of
agents on each island is randomly selected to move to the other island. These agents are
called movers.Communication between islands is limited so relocated agents can only
consume if they carry money with them. As is described below, banks arise that accept
deposits from agents and invest in capital and money. The banks o¤er money to movers
so that they can consume after being relocated.
We now describe the timing of events in each period. At the beginning of a period,
rms hire labor from young agents and rent capital from banks in order to produce the
consumption good. This good can be either consumed or used to produce capital for next
period. Then, factors are paid and young agents deposit their entire wage income in a bank.
Banks must then choose how much money and capital to hold in their portfolio. Next,
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agents learn their relocation status; movers withdraw cash from the bank while nonmovers
wait till the following period to collect goods.
Let 0 < pt <1 denote the price level at date t. Then the gross real rate of return on
money (Rm;t) between period t and t+1 is given by Rm;t  pt=pt+1: Also, let mt Mt=pt
denote per young person real money balances at date t: The central bank (CB) can a¤ect
the money supply in the economy through lump-sum injections or withdrawals of money.
The CB chooses z >  1, the rate of growth of the money supply, in order to maximize the
expected utility of agents. If the net money growth rate is positive then the government
uses the additional currency it issues to purchase goods, which it gives to current young
agents (at the start of a period) in the form of lump-sum transfers. If the net money
growth rate is negative, then the government collects lump-sum taxes from the current
young agents, which it uses to retire some of the currency. The tax (+) or transfer ( ) is
denoted  t. Since Mt+1 = (1+ z)Mt, the budget constraint of the government is given by
 t =
Mt  Mt 1
pt
=
z
1 + z
mt: (4)
For future reference, the stationary Friedman rule for this economy involves choosing
z to satisfy 1 + zFR  (1=): Also note that if and only if the economy is dynamically
e¢ cient, i.e.,  > 1; then zFR < 0 must hold. Parenthetically, note that if we replaced our
specication of technology with a linear storage technology that yields a xed gross real
return of x > 1; then such an economy is always dynamically e¢ cient and zFR < 0 would
always hold.
2.3 Banksbehavior
Banks take deposits from young agents and choose how much to invest in capital and
money. The deposit contract o¤ered to young agents allows movers to withdraw money
at the end of their rst period of life, just before they move. Agents are also allowed to
withdraw during their second period of life. As is usual in these kinds of models, money is
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dominated in rate of return if the CB deviates from the Friedman rule (if z > (1=t)  1).
In such cases, banks want to hold as little money as possible and thus will hold just enough
money to pay the movers.
Banks announce a return of dmt to each mover and d
n
t to each non-mover. The bank
maximizes its depositorsutility subject to the following constraints:
mt + st  wt +  t; (5)
dmt (wt +  t)  mtRm;t; (6)
(1  ) dnt (wt +  t)  tst; (7)
and non-negativity constraints. The rst equation is the banks balance sheet constraint.
The second equation states that the real balances held by the bank (from the perspective
of period t + 1, the date at which consumption occurs) must be enough to satisfy the
(predictable) liquidity demand from movers. The last constraint states that the remaining
goods (which were held in the form of capital) go to the nonmovers.
Let t  mt=(wt+ t) represent the reserve to deposit ratio. Since the banks constraints
hold with equality, the banksproblem can now be rewritten as
max
t2[0;1]
(wt +  t)
1 '
1  '
"

t

Rm;t
1 '
+ (1  )

t (1  t)
1  
1 '#
:
The rst order condition to this problem simplies to
(dm) ' (Rm;t) = (dn) ' t: (8)
The solution for t is given by
t =  (Rm;t; t) =
1
1 + 1 

t
Rm;t
 1 '
'
or, equivalently,
t =  (It) =

+ (1  ) (It)
1 '
'
; (9)
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where It  tRm;t denotes the gross nominal interest rate between t and t+ 1. Note that It
represents the opportunity cost of cash relative to capital. For future reference, note that
when ' = 1; i.e., u (c) = ln c; the solution is t = : Also, as is clear from (9), for all I > 1,
 R  i¤ ' R 1; specically,  2 (0; ) if '  1 and  2 (; 1) if ' > 1: Intuitively, think of
the bank allocating its deposit base among two goods, the consumption of movers and
the consumption of nonmovers. When the two are complements (substitutes) a low return
on money relative to capital (i.e., I > 1) requires that the share of the banks portfolio
allocated to consumption of movers (i.e., its money holdings) be relatively high (low).
3 General equilibrium
Since capital depreciates completely from one period to the next, capital next period is
equal to savings today:
st = kt+1: (10)
The rental rate of capital, t, and the wage rate, wt are given by equations (2) and (3),
respectively. Combining the bankss budget constraint (equation 5) with equation (10), we
can get an expression for kt+1 :
kt+1 = (w (kt) +  t) mt = (1  t) (w (kt) +  t) ; (11)
where t is given by equation (9). We can use equations (4) and the denition of  to
obtain expressions for  t and mt. These are
 t =
ztw (kt)
(1 + z)  zt
; (12)
mt = t (wt +  t) =
twt (1 + z)
(1 + z)  tz
: (13)
Next, we wish to nd an expression for the return on money, Rm;t. Since
mt+1
mt
=
(1 + z)Rm;t holds, we have
Rm;t =
t+1 (w (kt+1) +  t+1)
(1 + z)t (w (kt) +  t)
:
9
Finally, we can obtain expressions for dmt and d
n
t :
dmt =
t

Rm;t =
t

t+1 (w (kt+1) +  t+1)
(1 + z)t (w (kt) +  t)
;
dnt =
t (1  t)
1   =
f 0(kt+1) (1  t)
1   :
In steady states, we can simplify some of these expressions to get
Rm =
1
(1 + z)
; dm =
 (I)

1
(1 + z)
; dn =
f 0(k) (1   (I))
1   :
where I = f 0(k) (1 + z) : Also, the steady state value of k may be obtained from (11) as
solutions to
k =
(1   (z)) (1 + z)
(1 + z)  z (z) w (k
) : (14)
In equilibrium, z is determined by the CB by maximizing the stationary lifetime utility of
a representative generation. Formally, a stationary competitive equilibrium is a k that
solves (14) at a value of z determined by the benevolent CB, which satises  (z) 2 [0; 1]
and z > 1(k)   1:
3.1 Existence
It is possible to rewrite (14) as
 (z) = 1  k

w (k)
which when combined with (9) yields

+ (1  ) (f 0 (k) (1 + z)) 1 ''
= 1  k

w (k)
;
which can be rewritten as
k
w (k)
=
(1  ) (1 + z) 1 '' (f 0 (k)) 1 ''
+ (1  ) (1 + z) 1 '' (f 0 (k)) 1 ''
: (15)
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For a given z; the steady state capital-labor ratio may be computed as a xed point to
(15).
For ( + ) < 1; it is easy to check that
lim
k!0
k
w (k)
= 0
lim
k!1
k
w (k)
= 1
and that the derivative of the the left hand side of (15) is positive since kw
0(k)
w(k) = + < 1:
The following properties of the right hand side of (15) are also easy to verify:
lim
k!0
(1  ) (1 + z) 1 '' (f 0 (k)) 1 ''
+ (1  ) (1 + z) 1 '' (f 0 (k)) 1 ''
=

1 if '  1
0 if ' > 1
and
lim
k!1
(1  ) (1 + z) 1 '' (f 0 (k)) 1 ''
+ (1  ) (1 + z) 1 '' (f 0 (k)) 1 ''
=

0 if '  1
1 if ' > 1
:
Additionally, the derivative of the right hand side of (15) is given by
 (1  ) (1 + z) 1 ''

1 '
'

(f 0 (k))
1 '
'
 1
f 00 (k)h
+ (1  ) (1 + z) 1 '' (f 0 (k)) 1 ''
i2
which is negative (positive) for '  1 (> 1) : Combing all this information about (15)
immediately implies that there exists a unique xed point to (15) if '  1: Multiple,
unique, or no xed points are possible when ' > 1:
For future reference, note that for logarithmic utility, using t =  in (11), the expres-
sion for kt+1 is given by
kt+1 =
(1  ) (1 + z)
(1 + z)  z A (1  ) k
+
t : (16)
Only in this case, can we derive a closed form expression for the steady state value of k and
other variables:
dm (z) =
1
(1 + z)
; dn (z) = f 0(k (z)); (17)
k (z) =

(1  ) (1 + z)A (1  )
(1 + z)  z
 1
1 (+)
;  (z) =
zw (k (z))
(1 + z)  z (18)
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3.2 Characterization
In the next section, we will characterize the optimalmonetary policy, by which we mean
the choice of z that would maximize the stationary lifetime welfare of all current and future
two-period lived agents. But before we can get there, we will have to ascertain the e¤ects
of increasing the money growth rate on real money demand and the steady state capital
stock. Recall that the Tobin e¤ect is said to operative if an increase in the money growth
rate raises the steady state capital stock.3
Proposition 1 For any z >  1; and for any ' > 0; dkdz > 0 holds, implying that the
Tobin e¤ect is always operative.
[Proofs of this and other major results are in the appendix.]
This is a somewhat startling result considering its generality. The intuition is easiest to
articulate for the special case of logarithmic utility. In that case, money demand is interest-
invariant; indeed the fraction of the banks portfolio going to money or capital investment
is a constant. Also, since agents care only about old-age consumption, they save their
entire young-age income. A higher money growth rate unequivocally raises seigniorage
which, when rebated to the young, raises their incomes and hence the banks investment
in capital.
More generally, money demand will respond to the interest rate and so the share of the
banks portfolio going to money will depend on the money growth rate (i.e., both income
and substitution e¤ects of a change in the nominal interest rate on money demand will be
at play). A higher money growth rate will raise seigniorage (transfers to the young) only
on the good side of the La¤er curve.
Using Proposition 1, we can also establish the following general equilibrium result.
3For a good discussion of the literature on superneutrality of money or lack thereof, see Nikitin and
Russell (2006). Empirical support for the Tobin e¤ect is discussed in, among many other places, Ahmed
and Rogers (2002).
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Proposition 2 If ' < 1; then 0 (z) < 0 and if ' > 1; then 0 (z) > 0:
Proposition 2 states that when agents are su¢ ciently risk averse (i.e., more risk averse
than that implied by logarithmic preferences), the banks portfolio weight attached to
money rises with the money growth rate, i.e., real money demand rises when the real
return to money falls. Similarly, when agents are not too risk averse (i.e., less risk averse
than that implied by logarithmic preferences), real money demand falls when the real
return to money falls. Both ' < 1 and ' > 1 have been used in the literature; see Schreft
and Smith (1998) for a defence of either assumption.
3.3 Aside on the Friedman rule
The money growth rate corresponding to the Friedman rule, call it zFR ; is computed from
equating the return on capital to the return on money. In steady states, this reduces to
f 0(k)  1
1 + zFR
:
In general, since there is no closed form expression for k; we cannot derive a closed form
for zFR: In the case of logarithmic utility, and when  +  < 1; using (18), we can get
f 0(k) = A (k)+ 1 =
1
1 + z
) (k)+ 1 = (1 + z)  z
(1  ) (1 + z)A (1  ) :
Then using A (k)+ 1 = 1
1+zFR
; it follows that
zFRj'=1 = (1  )

  1
(1  ) : (19)
If  +  = 1; the return to capital is always A and so zFR = A   1 irrespective of ':
4 Optimal monetary policy
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4.1 No long run growth,  +  < 1
The CBs problem is to choose z so as to
max
z
W (z)  (w (k) +  (z))
1 '
1 '
h
 (dm (z))1 ' + (1  ) (dn (z))1 '
i
: (20)
Using (8), we can write d
n
dm =


Rm
 1
'
; also
(dm)1 ' + (1  )(dn)1 ' = (dm)1 '
"
+ (1  )


Rm
 1 '
'
#
= (dm)1 '

(z)
;
where the last step comes from the denition of . Using w (k) +  (z) = 1+z1+z (z)zw(k)
and dm = 
1
(1+z) ; we can rewrite (20) as
W (z) =
'
1  'w(k
 (z))1 '

1
1 + z   z(z)
1 '
(z) ':
Using (14), we get k

(1+z)(1 ) =
w(k)
(1+z) z which can be used to rewrite W (z) as
W (z) =
'
1  '

k(z)
(1 + z) (1  (z))
1 '
(z) '
and further as
W (z) =
'
1  '

k(z)
(1 + z)
1 ' 1
1  (z)

(1  (z))
(z)
'
: (21)
Using the denition of ; we get
1  (z)
(z)

=
(1  )

(I)
1 '
'
then from (21), we have
W (z) =
'
1  '

k(z)
(1 + z)
1 ' 1
1  (z)

(1  )

'
(I)1 ' : (22)
Using I = f 0 (k(z)) (1 + z) and f 0 (k) = Ak+ 1; we can rewrite (22) as
W (z) =
(1  )' (A)1 '
1  '

(k(z))+
1 ' 1
1  (z)

:
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To compute the z that maximizes W (z) ; we evaluate the derivative W 0 (z) as
W 0(z) =
(1  )' (A)1 '

(k(z))+
1 '
1  '

1
1  (z)

(1  ') ( + )

1
k(z)
dk(z)
dz

+
0(z)
1  (z)

:
(23)
Since the Tobin e¤ect has been shown to be always operative and since 0(z) changes sign
depending on the size of '; it is clear that W 0(z) does not have the same sign for all z:
Lemma 1 The sign ofW 0(z) depends only on the sign of   [1  ( + )] [(1 + z) (1   (z;'))]+
( + ) :
As discussed earlier, many authors using a model identical to ours but with a linear
storage technology, have established at least two condition-free results: a) zero ination
is optimal, and b) the Friedman rule is not optimal. Next we investigate if these results
extend to models with a concave neoclassical technology.
4.1.1 Zero ination
Not having a closed form expression for  at z = 0 is a stumbling block towards using
Lemma 1 directly to get the sign of W 0 (0) ; specically, it is not possible to derive gen-
eral necessary and su¢ cient conditions for zero ination to be optimal. Instead, we take
a di¤erent approach and seek su¢ cient conditions. Using Lemma 1, it follows that for
W 0 (0) > 0; it is necessary and su¢ cient that
W 0 (0) > 0, ( + )
[1  ( + )] > (1   (0)) : (24)
Clearly, since  (0) 2 (0; 1) ; a su¢ cient condition for (24) to hold is that (+)[1 (+)] > 1 or
( + ) 2  12 ; 1 :
Proposition 3 If ( + ) 2  12 ; 1 ; then zero ination (z = 0) is not optimal and positive
ination is optimal, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion.
15
In the case of logarithmic utility, we can derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
zero ination to not be optimal. Notice that for logarithmic preferences,  =  for all z:
Then (24) reduces to
( + )
[1  ( + )] > (1  ) : (25)
Also, if the steady state is dynamically e¢ cient, zFRj'=1 < 0 must hold; then (19) implies
that (1  ) < (1 ) : It is easy to check that (1  ) < (1 ) implies (25).
Corollary 1 In the case of logarithmic utility, for z > 0 to be optimal, it is su¢ cient that
the steady state be dynamically e¢ cient.
The upshot of this analysis is that when the knowledge externality () is su¢ ciently
high, it is welfare maximizing to set a positive money growth rate. If, as is standard, we
set  = 0:4 (see Cooley, 1995; ch. 1, page 20), then  > 0:1 is su¢ cient (not necessary) for
zero ination to not be optimal.
Example 1 Let A = 1;  = 0:4;  = 0:08;  = 0:08: Then ( + ) < 1=2 and (+)[1 (+)] >
(1  ) : Then z > 0 is optimal for both ' = 0:95 and ' = 1:1:
Example 1 illustrates that ( + ) 2  12 ; 1 is not necessary for positive ination to be
optimal and that (+)[1 (+)] > (1  ) may be enough to ensure the optimality of positive z
for a range of ' around 1.
4.1.2 Friedman rule
Using Lemma 1, it follows that the Friedman rule would not be optimal if and only if
  [1  ( + )] (1 + zFR) (1  )+ ( + ) > 0
was true. If the steady state is dynamically e¢ cient, then (1 + zFR) < 1 holds; therefore a
su¢ cient condition for the Friedman rule to not be optimal would be
( + )
[1  ( + )] > (1  )
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which is the same as (25).
Proposition 4 If the steady state under logarithmic utility is dynamically e¢ cient, then
the Friedman rule is not optimal irrespective of the degree of risk aversion.
In the special case of logarithmic utility, we know that zFRj'=1 = (1 )   1(1 ) : Then
it can be shown that
  [1  ( + )] (1 + zFRj'=1) (1  )+ ( + ) > 0
reduces to ( + ) (1 ) > 0 which always holds.
Corollary 2 For logarithmic utility, the Friedman rule is never optimal.
The upshot of the above discussion is that when '  1; a su¢ cient (by no means
necessary) condition for neither the Friedman rule nor zero ination to be optimal (and
for positive ination to be optimal) is (25). For the US, depending on the specics of how 
is measured [need more details here.....],  2 (0:06; 0:1) and so (1  ) has an upper bound
of 0.9. Then (25) requires ( + ) > 0:47 or if we set  = 0:4; for positive ination to be
optimal, it is enough that there be a mild degree of social increasing returns ( > 0:07) :
A su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for neither the Friedman rule nor zero in-
ation to be optimal (and for positive ination to be optimal) irrespective of the degree of
risk aversion is ( + ) > 1=2:
4.2 Long run endogenous growth,  +  = 1
With + = 1; the production function takes the AK form implying the possibility of long
run growth. For analytical convenience, henceforth we assume logarithmic utility. Then,
from (16) it follows that on a balanced growth path,
kt+1
kt
=
(1  ) (1 + z)
(1 + z)  z A (1  )  g (z)
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implying the rate of growth of the economy now depends on the money growth rate. Since
@
@z

1 + z
1  z (1 + )

=

(1 + z (1  ))2 > 0
it follows that g0(z) > 0 and hence the growth rate of the economy rises with an increase
in the money growth rate. This is the growth-analog of the standard Tobin e¤ect in levels.
Hence, with logarithmic utility, the Tobin e¤ect in growth rates is always operative thereby
complementing our result in the previous subsection. Also notice that g0 (z) > 0 implies
that the growth-maximizing money growth rate is not the Friedman rule.
Note mt+1mt =
w(kt+1)
w(kt)
= kt+1kt and so real balances are also growing along the same
balanced growth path. Then along this balanced growth path, the return on money is
given by
pt
pt+1
=

mt+1
(1 + z)mt

) pt
pt+1
=
(1  )
(1 + z)  zA (1  )
For logarithmic utility,
dmt =
pt
pt+1
=
(1  )
(1 + z)  zA (1  ) ; d
n
t =  = A: (26)
Note that kt+1kt = g (z) implies that k(t) = (g (z))
t k0: Welfare at t is given by
Wt (z)   ln (dmt (wt +  t))+(1  ) ln (dnt (wt +  t)), ln (wt +  t)+ ln dmt +(1  ) ln dnt
(27)
It is easy to check that
wt +  t = A (1  ) kt

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

Then it follows from (26)-(27) that Wt (z) is given by
Wt (z) = ln

A (1  ) kt

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

+ ln
(1  )
(1 + z)  zA (1  )+ (1  ) lnA
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which simplies to
Wt (z) = ln [A (1  ) k0] + ln

(g (z))t

+ ln

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

(28)
+ ln
(1  )
(1 + z)  zA (1  ) + (1  ) lnA
We posit that the central bank maximizes W (z) = P1t=0 tWt (z) where  2 (0; 1) is a
discount factor.
Proposition 5 Under logarithmic utility, when + = 1; i.e., there is endogenous growth,
and A > 1; then W 0  zFR > 0 implying the Friedman rule is not optimal.
Analogous to our earlier results, the Friedman rule is not welfare maximizing even in the
presence of endogenous long run growth. Additionally, it is inconsistent with maximum
growth. As is well known, models of endogenous growth ala Romer produce equilibria
with ine¢ ciently low levels of investment because the social return to capital investment
is higher (due to the knowledge externality) than the private return. As argued by Smith
(1998), the Friedman rule cannot cure this ine¢ ciency. Raising the money growth rate via
the Tobin e¤ect fosters private capital investment and hence improves welfare.
5 Concluding remarks
Most of the literature interested in optimal monetary policy in random relocation models
has studied models with a storage technology. In this paper, we show that optimal mone-
tary policy looks very di¤erent across random relocation models with concave production
functions and those with linear storage technologies. Many authors have demonstrated that
dynamically e¢ cient linear storage random relocation economies, irrespective of the degree
of risk aversion, always support zero ination as the golden rule. Here in contrast we show,
for example, that for logarithmic utility, zero ination is never optimal if the economy is
dynamically e¢ cient. The reason for this di¤erence lies in the power of the Tobin e¤ect. In
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economies with linear storage technologies, storage holdings of the current generation do
not inuence the incomes of future generations. In contrast, with neoclassical production,
any seigniorage collected is rebated to the young which augments the deposit base of the
young, and in standard cases, raises the investment in capital (the Tobin e¤ect) and hence
future incomes.
A question that is at the heart of many analyses of optimal monetary policy is, why do
central banks in the real world never implement the Friedman rule? To the fairly long list
of answers to this question, we add neoclassical production (specically, the Tobin e¤ect)
as one more possible explanation.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Straightforward di¤erentiation of (14) yields
1
k
dk(z)
dz
=
 0 (z)
(1   (z)) +
1
(1 + z)
 

1  f (z) + z0 (z)g
(1 + z)  z (z)

+
1
w (:)
w0 (:)
dk(z)
dz
which reduces to
dk(z)
dz

1
k
  w
0 (k)
w (k)

=
 0 (z)
(1   (z))+
1
(1 + z)
 

1
(1 + z)  z (z)
 
1   (z)

1 +
z0 (z)
 (z)

(29)
Next we seek an expression for z
0(z)
(z) : Since I (z)  (1 + z) f 0(k(z)); we have
dI
dz
= f 0(k) + (1 + z) f 00(k)
dk
dz
:
Since f 0 (k) = Ak+ 1 and f 00 (k) = A ( +    1) k+ 2; we have f 00 = ( +    1) Ik(1+z)
and so dIdz reduces to
dI
dz
= I

1
(1 + z)
  (1  ( + )) 1
k
dk
dz

(30)
Using (9), it is easy to check that
d
dz
=  

1  '
'

 (1  )

1
I
dI
dz

(31)
which, using (30) reduces to
0 (z) =  

1  '
'

 (1  )

1
(1 + z)
  (1  ( + )) 1
k
dk
dz

(32)
from where it follows that
z0 (z)
 (z)
=  z

1  '
'

(1  )

1
(1 + z)
  (1  ( + )) 1
k
dk
dz

: (33)
Since,kw
0(k)
w(k) = ( + ) holds, then (29) along with (32)-(33) implies
1
k
dk(z)
dz
[1  ( + )] =  1
(1   (z))

 

1  '
'

 (1  )

1
(1 + z)
  (1  ( + )) 1
k
dk(z)
dz

+
1
(1 + z)
 

1
(1 + z)  z (z)
 
1   (z)

1  z

1  '
'

(1  )

1
(1 + z)
  (1  ( + )) 1
k
dk
dz

:
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Repeated rearrangement yields
[1  ( + )] 1
k
dk(z)
dz

1 +

1  '
'

   z (1  )
[(1 + z)  z]

1  '
'

=
1
(1 + z)
241  '
'

  
z

1 '
'

(1  )
[(1 + z)  z] +

1  (1  ) (1 + z)
(1 + z)  z
35
which reduces to
1
k
dk(z)
dz
=
1
(1 + z) [1  ( + )]
24 

1
'

(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
35 (34)
So the sign of dk
(z)
dz is the same as the sign of 1+ z (1  )+ 

1 '
'

: Notice though that
(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
= (1 + z) (1  ) + ' > 0: 
B Proof of Proposition 2
Using (32) and (34), we get
d
dz
=  

1  '
'

 (1  )
24 1
(1 + z)
  1
(1 + z)
24 

1
'

(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
3535
which upon rearrangement yields
d
dz
=  

1  '
'

 (1  )
(1 + z)
24(1 + z) + 
n
1
'   (1 + z) 

1
'
o
(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
35
and nally to
d
dz
=  

1  '
'

 (1  )2
24 1
(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
35
| {z }
>0
The rest is immediate.
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C Proof of Lemma 1
From (23), we know
W 0(z) =
(1  )' (A)1 '

(k(z))+
1 '
1  '

1
1  (z)

(1  ') ( + )

1
k(z)
dk(z)
dz

+
0(z)
1  (z)

Using (32), one can simplify the term in square parenthesis above down to
(1  ')

1
k(z)
dk(z)
dz

( + ) +

1
'

(1  ( + ))

 

1
'


(1 + z)

:
Then
W 0(z) = (1  )' (A)1 '

(k(z))+
1 ' 1
1  (z)

 (35)
1
k(z)
dk(z)
dz

( + ) +

1
'

(z)(1  ( + ))

 

1
'

(z)
(1 + z)

:
Using (34) in (35), we note that the sign of W 0(z) depends only on the sign of

1
'


(1 + z)
8<:
h
( + ) +

1
'

(1  ( + ))
i
[1  ( + )]
24 1
(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
35  1
9=;
It is tedious but routine to check that8<:
h
( + ) +

1
'

(1  ( + ))
i
[1  ( + )]
24 1
(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
35  1
9=;
=
1
[1  ( + )]
8<:
h
( + ) +

1
'

(1  ( + ))
i
  [1  ( + )]
h
(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
oi
(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
9=;
=
( + ) [1 + (1 + z) (1  )]  (1 + z)(1  )
(1 + z) + 
n
1 '
'

  z
o
and since z >  1; the sign of W 0(z) depends only on the sign of
( + )  [1  ( + )] (1 + z) (1  ) :

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D Proof of Proposition 5
From (28), it follows that W (z) is given by
1X
t=0
t

ln [A (1  ) k0] + ln

(g (z))t

+ ln

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

+  ln
(1  )A (1  )
(1 + z)  z + (1  ) lnA

(36)
Notice
P1
t=0 
t ln

(g (z))t

=
P1
t=0 
tt ln g (z) = ln g (z)
P1
t=0 
tt and so (36) implies
(1  )

W (z) = ln g (z) (1  )

1X
t=0
 
tt

+ ln [A (1  ) k0] + ln

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

+ ln
(1  )
(1 + z)  zA (1  ) + (1  ) lnA;
then it is clear that optimal choice of z depends only on the following terms:
W (z) = ln g (z) (1  )

1X
t=0
tt+ ln

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

+  ln
(1  )A (1  )
(1 + z)  z
Since
P1
t=0 
tt = 
(1 )2 ; using the expression for g(z); we get
W (z) = 1
(1  ) ln

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

+ ln

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

   ln(1 + z)  z
+
1
(1  ) ln
h
A (1  )2
i
+  ln (1  ) (1  )A
and nally relevant terms,
W (z) = 1
(1  ) ln

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

+ ln

(1 + z)
(1 + z)  z

   ln [(1 + z)  z]
Note that
@
@z

1 + z
1 + z (1  )

=

(1 + z (1  ))2
Then it follows that
W 0 (z) = 1
(1 + z (1  ))


(1 + z)
1
(1  ) +
1
(1 + z)
  (1  )

Since f 0 (k) = A = 1=
 
1 + zFR

, it follows that 1=
 
1 + zFR

> (1  ) if A > 1: 
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